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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Paul Lawrence Rogers, Jr., appeals from his dismissal from the drug-court 
program and subsequent imposition and execution of sentence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
The Idaho Supreme Court stated the facts and procedure as follows: 
On February 24, 2003, Rogers was charged with possession of 
methamphetamine and driving without privileges. Rogers reached 
a plea agreement with the State, wherein the State agreed to drop 
the charge of driving without privileges and charges for burglary 
and attempted grand theft in an unrelated case, in return for Rogers 
pleading guilty to the possession charge. The State additionally 
agreed to dismiss the case altogether if Rogers successfully 
completed the Ada County Drug Court Program (ACDCP). 
Pursuant to the plea agreement Rogers pleaded guilty to 
possession of methamphetamine and entered into a Phase I 
contract for drug court on February 11, 2004. The district court 
judge, the Honorable Michael McLaughlin, then transferred 
jurisdiction over Rogers to the drug court. 
During Rogers's participation in ACDCP he violated various rules 
and was sanctioned twice. After these initial violations of the drug 
court program's rules Rogers seemed to improve markedly and 
even earned praise of his performance from the drug court judge on 
May 12, 2004, and May 26, 2004. However, on June 30, 2004, the 
drug court judge, the Honorable Ronald Wilper, confronted Rogers 
with information suggesting Rogers had been attempting to solicit 
fellow drug court participants to enter into a prostitution or "adult 
entertainment business." 
At a hearing on July 14, 2004, Judge Wilper terminated Rogers 
from the drug court program. 
State v. Rogers, 144 Idaho 738, 739-40, 170 P.3d 881, 882-83 (2007) (footnote 
omitted). The Court reversed Rogers' judgment, concluding that he had not been 
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provided due process in his termination from the drug court program. kl at 740-
43, 170 P.3d at 883-86. 
On remand, Rogers was provided an evidentiary hearing on the state's 
allegations of violating drug court requirements. (Tr., pp. 33-184; "Motion for 
Discharge from Drug Court" (Augmentation).) After taking evidence, the district 
court found that Rogers had violated drug court requirements by: 
1. Failing to attend the orientation on February 23, 2004; 
2. Failing to provide a urinalysis test (hereinafter "UA") on 
February 23, 2004; 
3. Using a controlled substance on or about February 24, 2004; 
4. Using a controlled substance on or about February 25, 2004; 
5. Using a controlled substance on or about March 29, 2004; 
6. Presenting an adulterated urine sample for testing on March 
29, 2004; 
7. Failing to attend group counseling on March 29, 2004; 
8. Failing to attend group counseling on March 30, 2004; 
9. Failing to attend group counseling on March 31, 2004; 
10. Using Methamphetamine on or about April 1, 2004; 
11. Failing to report for a UA on April 3, 2004; 
12. Failing to report for a UA on April 4, 2004; 
13. Failing to report for a UA on April 5, 2004; 
14. Failing to contact his mentor; 
15. Soliciting other drug court members to work for him in an 
adult entertainment business; 
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16. Failing to inform a doctor that he was a drug addict when he 
obtained medication; and 
17. Failing to pay his program fees. 
(Tr., p. 179, L. 6 - p. 184, L. 11; see also Tr., p. 37, L. 24 - p. 38, L. 8 (setting 
forth "allegation number 17," related to obtaining medication from a doctor, as 
later referenced by the district court in its ruling).) The court then entered 
judgment, sentenced Rogers to five years with one year determinate, suspended 
the sentence, and placed Rogers on probation expiring October 1, 2009. (R., pp. 
30-34.) Rogers filed a timely appeal from the judgment. (R., pp. 38-40.) 
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ISSUES 
Rogers states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Is there sufficient evidence to support the district court's 
finding that Mr. Rogers violated the drug court rules by "soliciting 
drug court participants to work in an adult entertainment business?" 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it terminated 
Mr. Rogers' participation in drug court? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 17.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. In making his claim that the court lacked sufficient evidence for its finding 
that Rogers violated drug court rules when he solicited other drug court 
participants to work at his adult entertainment business, Rogers relies upon 
evidence never presented to the district court and ignores the evidence actually 
presented. Should this Court decline to accept new evidence and further decline 
to weigh that evidence against the evidence presented to the district court? 
2. The district court found seventeen violations of the drug court program. 
Has Rogers failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in 
terminating him from the drug court program? 
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A. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Rogers' Claim Of Insufficient Evidence To Support The Finding That Rogers 
Violated Rules By Recruiting Fellow Drug Court Participants To Work For His 
"Adult Entertainment" Business Is Without Merit 
Introduction 
The district court found that Rogers solicited drug court participants to 
work in an adult entertainment business called "Desires, Inc.," which was a 
violation of the drug court rules. (Tr., p. 180, L. 20 - p. 181, L. 18.) On appeal 
Rogers asserts, relying on evidence never presented to the district court, that 
there was no prohibition against him soliciting other drug court participants to 
work for him in the adult entertainment business he wanted to start. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 19-20.) Rogers' argument is without merit because it requests this 
Court on appeal to accept new evidence and to ultimately deem the new 
evidence more credible than the evidence actually presented to the district court. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Where the district court conducts a hearing and enters findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if they 
are clearly erroneous. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-277, 971 P.2d 727, 
729-730 (1998). "Thus, a factual finding that a probation violation has been 
proven will be upheld on appeal if there is substantial evidence in the record to 
support the finding." State v. Egersdorf, 126 Idaho 684, 686, 889 P.2d 118, 
120 (Ct. App. 1995). 
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C. The Factual Findings Of The District Court Are Supported By Substantial 
Evidence In The Record 
The district court found that Rogers had violated "Condition No. 13," which 
proscribed drug court participants from being employed by other drug court 
participants, by offering at least one other drug court participant a job at "Desires, 
Inc.," an adult entertainment company he was trying to start. (Tr., p. 180, L. 20 -
p. 181, L. 18.) A review of the record shows substantial evidence supporting this 
finding of fact. 
At the hearing the state presented the testimony of Maureen Baker-
Burton, the Ada County Drug Court Coordinator. (Tr., p. 47, L. 13 - p. 49, L. 1.) 
As part of her duties she would participate in "staffings" with the treatment staff 
and probation officers, which would sometimes also include the drug court 
participants. (Tr., p. 67, Ls. 6-22.) At one such staffing she and others 
confronted Rogers with information that he had been contacting drug court 
participants and passing out business cards for a company called "Desires, Inc." 
(Tr., p. 67, L. 23 - p. 68, L. 23; State's Exhibit 6.) Rogers admitted passing out 
the cards and talking to others at drug court about the business. (Tr., p. 68, Ls. 
14-20.) He explained that the business was to provide escorts, dancers and 
strippers, but not prostitutes. (Tr., p. 68, L. 24 - p. 70, L. 11.) Ms. Baker-Burton 
explained that such a business and environment was harmful to participants in 
drug court, and that this was explained in both orientation and in groups. (Tr., p. 
70, L. 12 - p. 72, L. 3.) She also explained that the program did not allow drug 
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court participants to work together because that is harmful to the treatment. (Tr., 
p. 72, Ls. 4-21.) 
Ms. Baker-Burton explained that the September 2002 drug court 
handbook was in effect at the time Rogers was in the program. (Tr., p. 81, Ls. 9-
19.) She read part of that handbook in court: "'Condition Number 13: Participants 
may not be employed by other drug court participants,' on page 4." (Tr., p. 84, 
Ls. 13-20.) 
The state also presented evidence that Rogers admitted offering fellow 
drug court participant Dana Smith a "front office job" at the escort business. 
(State's Exhibit 4; see also Tr., p. 104, L. 1 - p. 113, L. 22.) 
Rogers testified and acknowledged that he had business cards made up 
for "Desire, Inc." with the intent of starting an adult entertainment business, and 
that he gave the cards to others in drug court, but claimed he did this just so they 
would have his phone number. (Tr., p. 123, L. 15 - p. 128, L. 12.) He denied 
ever asking anyone in drug court to be an escort, but admitted he talked to Dana 
Smith about an office job. (Tr., p. 128, L. 13- p. 129, L. 7; p. 134, L. 11 - p. 135, 
L. 5; see also p. 144, L. 7 - p. 146, L. 15.) He also admitted reading the 
handbook, including the part about drug court participants not being employed by 
other drug court participants. (Tr., p. 131, L. 13 - p. 132, L. 4; see also, State's 
Exhibit 1, p. 6 (question, "Have you received and reviewed a copy of the Drug 
Court Participant Handbook?" marked "Yes").) 
This evidence before the district court supports its factual findings. The 
evidence shows that Rogers was trying to start an escort service, that he talked 
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to more than one fellow drug court participant about the business, and, by his 
own admission, offered at least one an actual job in the business. 
Rogers does not dispute that the evidence allowed the district court to find 
that he solicited drug court participants to work at his adult entertainment 
business. (Appellant's brief, p. 19.) He does claim, however, that there was no 
"Condition No. 13" in the handbook. (Appellant's brief, pp. 19-20.) In doing so, 
he cites to a February 2002 version of the drug court handbook (Id.), which is 
evidence never presented to the district court. 
"It is axiomatic that an appellate court will not consider new evidence that 
was never before the trial court. We are limited to review of the record made 
below." State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376 n.1, 859 P.2d 972, 974 n.1 (Ct. 
App. 1993) (and cases cited). See also State v. Aims, 80 Idaho 146, 151, 326 
P.2d 998, 1000 (1958) (appellant may not create appellate record by presenting 
affidavits to appellate court); State v. Rambo, 121 Idaho 1, 822 P.2d 31 (Ct. App. 
1991) (appellant may not create appellate record by attaching exhibits to brief). 
Rogers did not present the February 2002 handbook to the district court, 
presented no evidence that this version of the handbook was even relevant to the 
proceedings, and made no presentation as to why he would have been given a 
version of the handbook upon his guilty plea in 2004 that had been superseded 
almost a year and one-half earlier. Rogers' request that this Court accept new 
evidence and find it more persuasive than the evidence presented to the district 
court is flatly inappropriate. 
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Rogers' argument as to why the Court should accept this new evidence 
and reject the contrary evidence actually presented to the district court is 
contained in a footnote to his argument. (Appellant's brief, pp. 19-20, n.14.) He 
argues that by taking notice of the February 2002 handbook and declining to take 
notice of the September 2002 handbook the Idaho Supreme Court determined 
that the February 2002 handbook was the "version of the Handbook Mr. Rogers 
agreed to be bound by when he entered drug court." (Appellant's brief, p. 20, n. 
14.) Therefore, he argues, it "is now law of the case" that the February 2002 
handbook was the applicable handbook. (Id.) This argument is fatally flawed in 
several respects. 
First, Rogers cites to no legal authority or argument to support his claim it 
is "law of the case" that the February 2002 handbook was the version applicable 
to him. He has therefore failed to present any "law of the case" issue on appeal. 
See I.A.R. 35; State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) ("A 
party waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, 
not just if both are lacking.") 
Second, Rogers did not preserve any appellate claim of "law of the case" 
by presenting that issue to the district court. The Idaho Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held that issues raised for the first time on appeal will not be 
considered. State v. Russell, 122 Idaho 488, 490, 835 P.2d 1299, 1301 (1992); 
State v. Lavy, 121 Idaho 842, 844, 828 P.2d 871, 873 (1992). Rogers did not 
object to evidence that the September 2002 handbook controlled (Tr., p. 81, Ls. 
9-19; p. 84, Ls. 13-20), and in fact presented evidence that was consistent with 
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that finding (Tr., p. 131, L. 13 - p. 132, L. 4 ). Because Rogers did not raise any 
· "law of the case" claim to the district court, he cannot raise this issue for the first 
time on appeal. 
Third, even if the claim of "law of the case" were properly before this 
Court, it is without merit. 
The "law of the case" doctrine provides that when "the Supreme 
Court, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle 
or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement 
becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout 
its subsequent progress, both in the trial court and upon 
subsequent appeal." Suitts v. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, N.A., 110 
Idaho 15, 21, 713 P.2d 1374, 1380 (1985) (quoting Fiscus v. 
BeartoothElec. Coop., Inc., 180 Mont. 434,435,591 P.2d 196, 197 
(1979)). 
Taylor v. Maile,_ Idaho_, 201 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2009). Thus, to be law of 
the case, a pronouncement of the Supreme Court must be "state[d] in its opinion" 
and must be "a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision." Rogers relies 
on an order taking judicial notice, not the opinion of the Court. In addition, what 
version of the handbook Rogers was provided is not a "principle or rule of law 
necessary to the decision" of the prior appeal. To tl")e contrary, what edition of 
the handbook applied to Rogers is clearly a finding of fact. Rogers' claim that the 
Idaho Supreme Court made a finding of fact that is binding on the district court 
lacks merit. 
As a final attack on the district court's factual finding that Rogers was 
prohibited from soliciting other drug court members to be his employees in the 
adult entertainment business he was trying to start, Rogers argues that the 
. September 2002 handbook "says nothing about drug court participants working 
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for one another." (Appellant's brief, p. 20, n.14.) The testimony of Maureen 
Baker-Burton was that the handbook contains '"Condition Number 13: 
Participants may not be employed by other drug court participants,' on page 4." 
(Tr., p. 84, Ls. 13-20.) This is the only evidence on what Condition 13 said 
presented to the district court. Rogers' claim of lack of evidence on this point is 
without merit. 
Even if this Court decided to go outside the record, it would discover that 
Rogers' argument is based on a misrepresentation. The copy of the September 
2002 handbook attached to the opinion of the Idaho Court of Appeals opinion in 
the prior appeal, at page 4, contains the following: "13. You must be employed 
or a student throughout the duration of the program. Participants may not be 
employed by other drug court participants." State v. Rogers, 2006 Opinion 
No. 59, Docket No. 31264, Appendix 2 (Idaho App. August 22, 2006) (emphasis 
changed). Even the most cursory comparison shows that the witness accurately 
quoted the relevant portion of the handbook. 
The evidence in the record supports the district court's findings of fact. 
Rogers' argument to the contrary depends entirely upon trying to persuade this 
Court to reject the evidence presented to the district court and instead accept 
and rely exclusively upon evidence never presented to the district court. 
Because Rogers' argument is diametrically opposed to actual appellate review 
and is inconsistent with well established rules of appellate review, his argument 
should be rejected. 
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11. 
The Multitude Of Violations Supports The District Court's Decision To Terminate 
Rogers' Participation In The Drug Court Program 
A. Introduction 
The district court found that Rogers was in violation of the drug court 
programming requirements in 17 different ways. (Tr., p. 179, L. 6 - p. 184, L. 
11.) The court ultimately concluded he was not a good candidate for 
reinstatement in that program. (Tr., p. 190, L. 6 - p. 191, L. 1.) The court, 
however, ultimately reinstated the previously imposed sentence and placed 
Rogers on probation until October 1, 2009. (Tr., p. 203, L. 1 - p. 207, L. 23.) 
Rogers argues that, because most of the violations occurred early in the 
program, the termination was an abuse of the district court's discretion. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 20-21.) Review of the record, however, shows that Rogers' 
compliance with the program rules was very marginal and short-lived, while his 
violations are numerous. The record supports the district court's exercise of 
discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Revocation of probation is within the discretion of the district court and 
may occur at any time during the probationary period if the probationer has 
violated any of the terms of the probation." State v. Boss, 122 Idaho 747, 748, 
838 P.2d 876, 877 (Ct. App. 1992). Absent an abuse of discretion, the district 
court's decision to revoke probation will not be reversed on appeal. State v. 
Corder, 115 Idaho 1137, 1138, 772 P.2d 1231, 1232 (Ct. App. 1989). On review, 
the appellate court must determine whether the district court "acted within the 
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boundaries of its discretion, consistent with any legal standards applicable to 
specific choices, and whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason." State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 
1994). 
C. The District Court Acted Within The Bounds Of Its Discretion When It 
Concluded That Rogers' Multiple Violations Justified His Termination From 
The Drug Court Program 
Rogers was accepted into the drug court program and instructed to attend 
orientation on February 23, 2004. He missed the orientation, instead going and 
using drugs; he absconded from the program for about a week in late March and 
early April, again to use drugs; in early June he obtained a prescription without 
informing the doctor that he is an addict, in violation of drug court rules; the 
staffing related to solicitation of drug court members to work in his adult 
entertainment business was on June 25, 2004; at no point did he contact his 
mentor or pay any of the costs he was required to pay, instead choosing to 
spend his money on drugs. (Tr., p. 179, L. 6 - p. 184, L. 11; see also Tr., p. 37, 
L. 24 - p. 38, L. 8 (setting forth "allegation number 17," related to obtaining 
medication from a doctor, as later referenced by the district court in its ruling); 
State's Exhibit 5.) It thus appears that Rogers was never in total compliance with 
the requirements of the program (seeing his mentor and paying his fees). He 
absconded from the program in February and again for a week in late March and 
early April to use drugs. He did better in April (after he came back) and May, but 
in early June he obtained a prescription without informing the doctor of his 
addiction and in late June decided to start his own adult entertainment business 
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and consulted with fellow drug court participants about the business and even 
offered at least one a job. Thus, the most substantial period of compliance was 
about seven weeks during just a little over four months while he was in the 
program. 
Rogers relies primarily on his argument that the district court wrongly 
found a violation in relation to his attempt to start an adult entertainment business 
in contending that the court abused its discretion. (Appellant's brief, p. 21.) As 
shown above, the district court did not wrongly find this violation. 
Rogers also argues that he had been living "cleanly" in the community for 
a year prior to the district court's decision. (Appellant's brief, p. 21.) He cites for 
this proposition the argument of his trial counsel. (Id. (citing Tr., p. 199, Ls. 17-
22; p. 200, Ls. 17-19).) Even assuming counsel correctly represented a lack of 
parole violations, this does not show an abuse of discretion. Rogers' past 
behavior while in the drug court program is probably a better predictor of his 
future behavior in that program than his performance on parole, which most likely 
did not require the same level of intervention and supervision. In addition, it is 
probable that the district court considered Rogers' most recent performance on 
parole as a factor that persuaded it to ultimately suspend the sentence and order 
probation. 
Rogers has failed to show that the court abused its discretion by declining 
to reinstate Rogers in the drug court program and instead reinstating his 
sentence and placing him on probation. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
terminating Rogers from the drug court program, reinstating his sentence, and 
placing him on probation, 
DATED this 6th day of April 2009. 
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